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We analyze how uncertainty about when infoimation about future returns to a project may be
revealed affects investment. While "good news" about future returns boosts investment, "good news about
news" (that is, news that information may arrive sooner) is shown to depress investment. We show that
early revelation increases the value of an irreversible investment project to a risk-neutral investor. We
relate our results on preference for early revelation to results in non-expected utility theory. Our framework
allows us to study irreversible investment projects whose value has a time-variable volatility. W also
consider how heterogeneity of revelation information across firms may induce a better-informed firm to
share its information with competitors.
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When decisions have an irreversible component,uncertainty about future outcomes plays
a key role in the decision to commit to a course of action. Since it iscostly to reverse a
decision, waiting to commit until some of the uncertainty is resolvedmay yield benefits that
more than outweigh the forgone short-run returns. The possible arrival ofsignificant new
information about outcomes thus can make the option ofwaiting to commit quite valuable.
If "news" about future possible outcomes is valuable whendecisions are costly to
reverse, then information about when such news might arrive ("news aboutnews") should be
valuable as well. The likelihood of receiving new information shouldaffect the timing of
irreversible decisions, as should changes in that likelihood,even if these changes convey no
new information about what outcomes may be. Trading on assetexchanges, for example, often
slows in anticipation of release of new economic data;political decisions are often delayed if it
is believed that relevant new information willsoon become available.
The most complete discussion of the implications ofuncertainty about future returns
when decisions are irreversible is in the theory of irreversibleinvestment, where it is shown
that the option value of waiting to investmay lead firms not to invest in projects which have a
positive expected present discounted value. This literature demonstrates thatuncertainty about
future returns to a project may in itself depress investment, and thatpositive information about
future returns will increase investment.'
Cukierman (1980) and Bernanke (1983) considered models in which the arrivalof information
makes future returns less uncertain, providing a channel forvaluing the option to wait and gather
more information. In McDonald and Siegel (1986), Pindyck (1988), and Bertola and Caballero
(1994) among others, information arrives eachperiod and updates the conditional distributionof
future returns, An excellent treatment of much of this literaturecan be found in a recent book by
Dixit and Pindyck (1994).2
While the theory of irreversible investment yields ageneral framework for studying
uncertainty about the value of an installed project, uncertainty about wheninformation about
outcomes may be revealed has not been treated explicitly. In thispaper we present a model
that separates the effect on investment of uncertainty about the valueof an installed project into
the effects of uncertainty about eventual returns ("outcomeuncertainty") and the effects of
uncertainty about when outcome uncertainty itself may be resolved ("revelationuncertainty").
It seems intuitive that a higher probability of knowing outcomessooner, which could be
characterized as "good news" about revelation, would decreasecurrent investment as a firm
waits to learn about outcomes. We show how our resultson uncertainty about the arrival of
new information are related to the time-varying volatility in the value ofa new project. (In
contrast, most of the literature has studied the impact of uncertainty on investment when the
variance of value, or some underlying fundamentalstays constant over time.) We further show
that the higher (lower) variance of value atany period may delay (speed up) commitment. In
fact, a comn-ion form of behavior under uncertainty --waita pre-specified length of time, then
act if information has still not arrived --isinconsistent with constant volatility of returns over
time.
Since irreversibility implies a preference for early resolution ofuncertainty in an
expected utility framework, one may ask how our results relate to the Kreps-Porteus(1978)
results on preference for early resolution of uncertainty, where anonexpected utility framework
is key. We show that formally irreversibility implies aconvex "aggregator" function in an
expected utility framework, making our results fully consistent with those in thenonexpected
utility literature.4
Eastern European countries during the period of large-scaleprivatization and market reform. It
will be evident that these examples involve a variance of returns thatchanges over time.
During the period of negotiation between 1991 and 1993, ratification of the North
American Free Trade Agreement was seen as highly favorable to theprofitability of doing
business in Mexico. During these two years, however, therewas a good deal of uncertainty as
to when negotiations and discussions in Congress would end and the outcome wouldbe
revealed. Sometimes, smooth negotiations indicated an early resolution ofuncertainty, while
at other times the process slowed down and it appeared that the outcome wouldnot be known
for a long while. How might changes in the speed of theprocess have affected investment in
Mexico? (This is a separate issue from how investment is affected bya change in the
probability of NAFTA ratification.)
After the collapse of communism, several countries in Eastern Europe undertooka
large-scale effort to privatize state-owned enterprises, coupled with extensive market reform.
Poland at the beginning of the 1990's is a good example. During thisperiod Poland
experienced a collapse in output, as well as a collapse in both domestic and foreign direct
investment (FDI). One possible explanation for the collapse in FDI is thatuncertainty about
future returns to projects in Poland (outcome uncertainty) was so magnified that investors held
off from any commitment until the outcome of the reforms was clearer. It ispuzzling however
that FDI in Poland did not pick up when the prospects for future returns began to look better.
The explanation may be that whenever large-scale reforms begin to succeed,so that expected
future returns increase, the rate at which information about future returns flows in also becomes
faster. "Good news" about outcomes is accompanied by "good news" about revelation. If the5
effect of waiting for more information dominates the effect ofnewly acquired positive
information, investment decreases.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section wepresent a simple example to
illustrate the connection between our work and a standard model of irreversibleinvestment,
and introduce time-varying volatility into this simple model in section three. Insection four we
present a model of the effects of uncertain time arrival of a single relevant piece of information.
Section five relates our results to those in the nonexpected utility literature. In section sixwe
show how heterogeneity of information across firms affects our results. The final section
contains conclusions.
2. A Simple Example
We begin with the simple two-period model of irreversible investment presented in
chapter 2 of Dixit and Pindyck (1994). A risk-neutral firm can invest in a factory that produces
one widget per year forever, with zero operating cost. The factory can be built instantaneously,
at cost land the investment is irreversible. The price of a widget is currently F0, but will either
rise to 1 .5P0 (with probability '/2)orfall to O.5P0 (with probability '/2)tomorrow,remaining at
those levels forever after. (Note that the expected value of the future price as of today isP0.)
The firm has the option of delaying commitment to the project. Suppose the firm discounts
future cash flows by a factor 3. If the firm invests in the factory today, the expected netpresent
value of the investment, which we call the value of committing to the investment, is
v =-j (1) corni-p6
As in Dixit and Pindyck, assume that this net present value is positive (i.e.,P0I(l-) >1).
Nonetheless, it may not be optimal to commit to the investment today. The alternative is
for the firm to remain uncommitted, deciding whether or not to build the factory afterwidget
price uncertainty has been resolved. The option of waiting is valuable if in some states of
nature, the firm would prefer not to have invested. In this example, this refers to the state in
which the price falls to O.5P0 in the second period. We assume that O.5P0/(l-) <I,so that it is
not optimal to invest in the second period if the low price obtains. (If this inequality did not
hold, the firm would never regret having committed to the investment.) Hence, if the firm
waits till the second period, thus forgoing first-period revenues, it will invest only under the
high price realization, so that the expected net present value of the investment as of the first
period, which we call the value of remaining uncommitted, is
= 1.5P0- (2) UflC 2i—3
Thedecision of whether it is optimal to commit to investment in the first period or to
remain uncommitted depends on the relative values of the three parameters in the model: P0, I,




Equivalently, the firm will find it optimal to wait if the value of the option to wait, namely V
-
Vcomis positive.
Now suppose that with probability 1-it the price remains at P0 tomorrow, whereas the
price rises or falls by half its value, each with probability ic/2. How will the possibility of no
change in the price affect the decision of whether to commit to investment today? (The
decision tree is represented by the part of Figure 1 describing only periods 0 and 1.) The net
present value of the project if the firm commits to investment today is independent of it. The
value of being uncommitted, however, is affected and becomes





Suppose that (3) holds with inequality, so that if the price were certain to change, it would be
optimal for the firm to remain uncommitted. To derive a critical value of It, call it It, for
which the firm is indifferent between committing and not committing, one equates (1) and (4)




The assumption that under the bad outcome, it is optimal not to invest (i.e., 0.5P0/(l-p) <
1), ensures that the denominator is positive, so that it' > 0. When (3) holds with inequality, it
is strictly less than one. For it <itt, the firm will find it optimal to commit to investment8
today. Since the decision of whether or not to commit to investment today can be
characterized, for given values of the other parameters, by the critical value of it"' relative to
the actual it, equation (5) also illustrates Bernanke's (1983) "bad news principle". For a given
value of committing to the project today (the numerator of the second fraction in (5)), it is the
(absolute) value of the bad outcome that determines whether or not to wait. The same result
may be obtained by calculating the value of the option to wait, as in the next paragraph.
One can also calculate the first-period value of the investment opportunity to the firm as
a function of it, which is the project's net present value under the optimal strategy. If it ￿ it"',
the value of the project is 1/corn, given by (1), while if it> it"', the value of the project is 1'
given by (4). Since (4) is greater than (1) for it> it"' and since (4) is itself increasing in it, the
value of the firm is weakly increasing in it. The value of the option to wait is the maximum of
zero and V1,,,, -om' sothe option will have positive value when it> it" and will be increasing
in it. Hence an increase in it will increase the value of the firm but will decrease (if it crosses
the critical threshold it*) current investment. This is not surprising. An increase in it is a
mean-preserving spread of the distribution of future returns. Specifically, the variance of
P02 p2
second-periodreturns isit .Higheruncertainty about future returns increases the
4(1[3)2
valueof the firm as it decreases investment.
3. Time-Varying Volatility
Having studied a two-period model in which high variance in returns may create an
incentive to wait before committing to an irreversible project, we now consider a three-period
model in which information arrives in the second and third periods, t= 1and t= 2.This setup9
will allow us to study irreversible investment when the volatility of returns may vary over time.
In contrast, in the standard framework, as represented by the discrete-time models in Dixit and
Pindyck (1994) or the continuous-time models with geometric Brownian motion (as in
McDonald and Siegel [1986]), the instantaneous variance is constant.
As above, a risk-neutral firm can invest in a factory that produces one widget per year
forever, with zero operating cost, where the investment cost, I, is sunk. The initial price of a
widget, as before, is F0, and may rise to (1 +u)P0in the second period with probability rrI2 or
fall to (1 -d)P0with probability itI2,whilewith probability 1-it, it stays the same. In the third
period, the price may rise to (1 +u)P1with probability p12 or fall to (1 -d)P1 withprobability
p72, while with probability l-p, it remains equal to P1. The probabilities itandp may be
unequal, implying time-varying volatility of returns. To see this, note that the variance of the
value of the installed project (where u =a)is Q2= ir(uP0/(1-))2at t=0and is 2=
p(uP1/(1-))2at t=1. The decision tree is represented in Figure 1, where the middle node in
each period represents the event of no change in price.
For given values of the four parameters, Pc/I,u,d, and ,wecan calculate combinations
of itandp such that the firm is indifferent between committing to investment in the first period
or remaining uncommitted. More generally, we could think of an indifference "surface" in
these six parameters. A higher value of either of the probabilities itorp, holding the remaining
five parameters constant implies that the firm prefers to remain uncommitted. One way to
solve the problem is by backward induction, which we employ to produce such a surface in it
andp, the solid line in Figure 2. (The values for the remaining parameters are Pc/I =0.15,u =
d=Y2, and [= .91.)Inthis figure, combinations of itandp below the solid curve imply that10
the firm commits to the project at t =0.Note that these could involve situations in which the
variance is high in the first period but low in the second, or vice versa. In the case that itandp
lie above the curve and there is no change in the price between the first and the second period,
the firm will commit at t =1for p <p=0.19,represented by the dashed line in Figure 2.
Let us first consider the standard model of constant volatility of returns over time, which
corresponds to points along the diagonal, where it= p.A standard result from the literature is
that higher uncertainty (i.e., a higher a) implies a higher value to remaining uncommitted.
Hence, using the parameter values of the figure, a firm which would be indifferent at it= p=
0.55,would prefer to remain unconimitted at t =0for any value above 0.55. Note that if there
is no price change between the two periods (that is, P0 =F1),constant volatility of returns
implies that the firm chooses either to commit at t =0or wait until t= 2,after which time no
more information will be revealed. This characteristic can be shown to be more general: with
constant volatility of returns afirm which finds it optimal not to commit in the beginning will
remain uncommitted as long as the price is unchanged but may change in the future.
In contrast, consider allowing the volatility of returns to vary over time, corresponding to
points off the diagonal, wherep.As the solid-line indifference surface in the figure makes
clear, higher variance of returns in the first period (corresponding to it> 0.55)can be offset by
lower variance in the second period (corresponding to p <0.55).Committing at t =1
(corresponding to combinations of itandp in the northwest part of the figure) is possible even
if there has been no change in price.11
4. Uncertainty about the Time of Arrival of Information
In the above model, information arrived in each period, but the volatility of returns was
allowed to vary over time, in contrast to the standard model with constant volatility. In many
situations involving irreversible investment, there is a single important piece of information,
which may be revealed at an unknown point in time. Prior to the revelation of this piece of
information, uncertainty about returns is large; subsequent to its revelation this uncertainty is
significantly reduced (or perhaps eliminated).
Toward this end, we consider a multiperiod model of optimal timing of irreversible
investment in a single risky asset. The asset yields a known return r each period until a
known time 'I', after which it yields a net return of either Rh with probability p or R' with
probability i-p. Assume Rh>0>R' and pRh+ (l-p)R'>0. A risk-neutral firm discounts
returns by a factor per period. The return to no investment is normalized to zero.2
Conceptually, the return to the risky asset will be affected by the realization of some future
event which is known to occur at time T,3 where the realization may be known with certainty at
some time T before 'I'.(One may call t the "outcome date" and T the "revelation date.")
2Thismodeling is equivalent to existence of a second asset whose return is riskless and
investment is reversible, rather than irreversible. In this case the return to the risky asset is defined
as the excess over the return to the safe asset.
An example of such an event would be an election, where the new party takes office on a given
day, but where the election's outcome may be known beforehand; or, a possible policy change
scheduled to take effect on a given date, where it is known well beforehand whether or not it will
take place.
In this paper we assume the outcome date 'I' is known and concentrate on uncertainty about the
timing of revelation. We hold t independent of T so that changes in the distribution of T can be
seen as pure changes in revelation uncertainty,not affecting the stream of returns. Alternatively,
one can concentrate on uncertainty about the outcome date, with no possibility of early revelation,
as in Drazen and Helpman (1990) and Calvo and Drazen (1994).12
Uncertainty about the value of an installed project stems from two sources: uncertainty about
the eventual returns to the installed project (outcome uncertainty) and uncertainty about when
information about outcomes may be revealed (revelation uncertainty). The return structure of
the currently risky asset is time-invariant, so that the probability that information will be
revealed in each period will depend on time, but the nature of the information that will be
revealed does not change. We further assume that bad outcomes matter, in the sense of ruling
out parameter values such that investment is undertaken immediately even though it is known
that the bad outcome will occur.5The revelation date T (￿ 'I') (the first date at which the
outcome will be known with certainty) is stochastic, with a subjective probability distribution
represented by the cumulative distribution function H(T). The distribution H(T) implies
probabilities of revelation in each period, conditional on uncertainty not having been
previously resolved. Looking at the problem from period 0, the probability itofuncertainty
being resolved in period t, conditional on no previous resolution, is
=h(t)
(6) 1 -H(t-1)
The timing of decisions and events if uncertainty has not been resolved and the firm has
not committed to investment is as follows. At the beginning of period t, the firm decides
whether to commit to investment in the risky asset, or remain uncommitted. If it commits
(irreversibly) the firm earns rinevery period from t to t-l and R' at '1'. Uncertainty is then
Formally, we assume that for t= 0, Psr+PT tR I < 0 .Notethat the condition being
satisfied at t =0implies that it will be satisfied for all t> 0, since 3 < 1. Intuitively, the condition
is that the discounted flow of returns until 'I' cannot be so high as to offset a certain bad outcome.13
resolved with probability ice.Ifthe firm is uncommitted and the news is good (R' =Rhwith
probability p), the firm undertakes the project at t+1. However, if the news is bad, the firm
decides never to undertake the project. Because returns are stationary and the distribution H(T)
is known ,thefirm's decision may be described as choosing a date T* to commit conditional on
uncertainty not having been previously resolved. Equivalently, the firm chooses a maximum
number of periods to wait before committing to investment.
One way to find the optimal solution is first to calculate the expected value as oft of
waiting j periods to commit to investment in excess of the expected value of committing at t.
Call this excess value V+(t). The optimal length of time to wait before committing to
investment is then found by simply choosing the maximum value V+.(t) in the set {V+(t)} and
waiting jt periods to invest. We formalize this as
PROPOSITION 1: The optimal waiting time is given by
argmax {V.(O)} (7)
0 ￿j￿
(The proof of all propositions is in the Appendix.) An implication of Proposition 1 is
COROLLARY 1: A necessary and sufficient condition for it to be optimal to postpone
investment at time 0 is that some V(O) (j>O) be positive.
We now derive some basic results on the optimal length of time to wait to invest as a
function of theAfirst result is that a higher likelihood of knowing early makes waiting
more attractive.
PROPOSITION 2 : An increase in the probability of revelation in any future period I will
increase the value of waiting to invest at least I periods, that is, av(o)Ia> 0,for allj ￿I.14
Note that in contrast to the effect of good outcome news, 'good' news about revelation
(in the sense of uncertainty being resolved sooner) may depress current investment and can
never increase it. We formalize this result as
PROPOSITION 3: Suppose that the optimal action is to invest immediately. An increase in
revelation probabilities can lead to a postponement of investment; an increase in the probability
of the good outcome carmot.
More generally, one can characterize the optimal length of postponement in terms of
revelation probabilities as follows: Postpone investment as long as the probability of
revelation in some future period is "sufficiently" high. A necessary condition for the optimality
of investing at time T is that all future revelation probabilities are "sufficiently" low.
In the previous model, in which information arrived each period, constant volatility of
returns implied that a firm would either commit immediately or wait until there was no
uncertainty, if price was unchanged. There is an intuitive analogue to this in this model. If the
revelation probability, rc, is the same in each period, then the firm either commits immediately
or waits until all information has been revealed.6
The results we have presented up to now have stressed that earlier revelation of
uncertainty makes initial investment less likely by raising the value of the option to wait.
However, a more interesting question is whether early revelation depresses investment. Is the
accumulation of capital higher or lower, in the sense of the number of projects being
undertaken ex post, when information is more likely to be revealed earlier? Since our model is
6Formally,one can show that the critical value of itsuchthat the firm is indifferent is
monotonically non-increasing over time.15
one of irreversible investment in a single project of exogenous size, the best measure to address
this issue is the probability that the project will be undertaken over the firm's horizon.
Let us denote the probability that a project will be undertaken as P(I). When T* =0,then
P(1) =1.However, when the optimal decision is to postpone investment, that is, when T > 0,
the probability of investment is less than unity. The probability that the project will not be
undertaken is equal to the probability that there is revelation before the decision date (call this
probability A(T)) multiplied by the probability that the revelation is bad (1 -p). Thus P(]) =
1-(1-p)A(T*).One can show that the probability of investment depends (strictly) negatively
on ltk for k < T* and (weakly) negatively on ltk for k ￿ T. Thus, early revelation that leads the
firm to postpone undertaking a project reduces the probability of investment because
postponement allows the firm the possibility of learning that the project will be loss-making.
It is instructive to establish the relation between changes in revelation uncertainty and the
variability of the value of an installed project. In a discrete time framework it is convenient to
characterize the variability of installed value J/ in terms of the one-period-ahead variance
-EIIV)2.In our model, this variance is 32(Tt)var(R) if there has not been
revelation before t, and zero otherwise, where var (R) p(Rh)2 + (1 -p)(R')2 -[pRh +(1 -
isthe variance of returns. For simplicity of exposition, we set1 for the rest of the
discussion. The variance of the value is affected by revelation uncertainty (through itt) and by
outcome uncertainty (through var(R)). It is clear that this variance is variable over time as long
as the revelation probabilities are themselves time-varying. Good revelation news through an
increase in the it increases the (one-period ahead) variance of installed value at time t while
leaving all other variances the same. On the other hand, good outcome news through a16
decrease in var(R) decreases the variance of installed value in all time periods by the same
proportion. The optimal length of postponement of investment can be characterized in terms of
variances: Postpone investment as long as the variance of installed value in some future period
is "sufficiently" high. A necessary condition for the optimality of investing at time T is that all
subsequent variances are "sufficiently" low.
So far we have considered the effect of revelation uncertainty on the decision to
undertake or postpone investment, a key result being that "good" revelation news can lead to a
fall both in current investment and in expected investment over the long horizon. We end this
section with an observation on the effect of revelation news on the value of the option to
postpone commitment. While "good" revelation news may reduce investment, it will always
increase the value of the proj ect.7
5. The Preference for Early Revelation
Since the value of the project increases with itt,thefirm has a preference for early
resolution of uncertainty. How can this be reconciled with the result that expected utility
maximizers are indifferent to the timing of resolution of uncertainty? (Our firm here is risk-
neutral.) Irreversibility must be key to the result.
Consider first the case where investment is fully reversible, so that the decision at time 0
as to whether or not to commit to investment would not constrain the state at time 1. Let us
denote by V the value associated with being uncommitted at the beginning of period t, and by
This follows from proposition 2, on observing that the option value is max J'(0).
0 ￿j ￿T17
j(A0) thecurrent flow return from either committing or not committing (A0 = ii), where
committing today implies a price today and an expected price tomorrow of P0. We could then




whereE0 is the expectation as of time 0. Since the second term is independent ofA0, (8) may
be written
V0 =maxJ(A0)+3E0 V1. (8')
A0
In the case where investment is irreversible, so that A1 =ifA0 = the maximization




Next period's expected utility, E0W1, equals E0V1 if the firm chooses to remain uncommitted at
time 0 or E0(P1)/(1-)ifthe firm commits to investment at time 0. Equation (9) may then be
written
E (F)
V0 =max{P0—I +3 ,O +3EØV}
(9')
E(P)P-I =—J--max{
01_ 0+EV} 0 i-p p 01
From(8) and (9), we see that there is a linear relation between current and future
expected utility whether investment decisions are reversible or not, as must be the case for von18
Neumann-Morgenstern preferences. However, comparing (8') and (9'), we see that while future
utility is linear in E0 V1 and hence in underlying period 0 randomness when investment is
reversible, it is convex in E0V1 and hence randomness as seen from period zero in the
irreversible case. Hence the preference for early resolution of uncertainty can be related to an
inherent convexity in utility aggregation, as in nonexpected utility preferences (see Kreps and
Porteus [19781 or Epstein and Zin [19911), but here it arises under expected utility
maximization due to irreversibility.
6. Many Firms
So far we have implicitly assumed that a single firm has sole access to the project. In
many cases, however, an investment or project may be available to more than one potential
investor. For an individual firm this means that there is some probability that by waiting, the
opportunity to invest in a future period will be lost, implying an incentive to commit earlier. In
this section we enrich the framework in order to study the interaction between the possibility of
early revelation and of investment being pre-empted. We show that the possibility of being
pre-empted implies not only that the firm may commit earlier, but also that a firm with a
superior ability to process information and hence benefit from early revelation will find it
optimal to share its information costlessly with a firm with an inferior information processing
ability.
To make these ideas more precise, suppose that at the beginning of each period t, there is
an exogenous probability 1 -0, that the investment opportunity will disappear if the firm
remains uncommitted. (If the firm has committed earlier, the investment is "locked in" and19
cannot disappear.) If the investment opportunity is still available (this occurring with
probability Or), there is a probabilitythat uncertainty will be resolved. One can then show
that the "disappearance" probabilities O have a similar effect to revelation probabilities itt,as
follows.
PROPOSITION 4: A decrease in any of the survival probabilities O will decrease the value of
waiting to invest at least I periods and will decrease (or leave unchanged) the optimal waiting
time.
If the firm takes the O as parametric and exogenous to its decisions, then it is irrelevant
for its decisions whether the disappearance of the investment possibility comes from an act of
nature or from a competitor grabbing the project; in either case the result in Proposition 4 will
hold. In this sense, under the assumption that O is taken as exogenous, the simple framework
presented above can capture the interaction of many firms competing for the same project.
In the case where the firm takes account of the influence its own actions may have on 0,
the analysis is more complicated. Each firm will take account of other firms' strategies in
deciding when to commit. In a two-player game, for example, one can derive optimal
strategies and the critical levels of the it1consistentwith commitment not taking place
immediately8, but that is not our interest here. Rather, we want to point out an interesting
implication of heterogeneity in information, namely that a firm with a better ability to process
information may find it optimal to share some of its information costlessly with a less well-
informed firm.
SAssumethat if both firms move simultaneously the returns will be split, but if one firm moves
first and pre-empts, it gets the entire project. Then the critical value of the {it1}mustbe larger
than in the case of a sole potential investor in order to make it optimal to wait.20
Suppose that two firms are asymmetric in their ability to process information in the
following sense: some events or pieces of information that would reveal the ultimate outcome
to the first firm will not reveal it to the second. Formally, the first firm (which has better
ability to process information, or firm B for short) perceives higher revelation probabilities
{7t}thanthe second (which has worse information processing ability, or firm W for short).
We argue that if there is a possibility that firm B may be pre-empted by firm W, it will want to
share its ability to process information with its competitor to induce the competitor not to
commit to investment. (When both firms move simultaneously, they split the returns from the
project.)
To make this more specific, suppose that firm B perceives a high enough chance of early
revelation that it is optimal for it to wait (say, until period j). Its competitor, firm W, perceives
such a low chance of early revelation, that it would invest immediately. In other words, firm
W's optimal behavior given low revelation probabilities implies that firm B faces 0 =0.Firm
B would therefore find it optimal to choose to commit immediately as well, and they would
split the expected value of the project at time 0. If firm B can induce firm W to wait untilj, it
can do no worse than split the project at j. Since the expected value of waiting till j exceeds
that of committing at 0, it will be optimal for firm B to try to induce firm W to wait. It could
do this by sharing its knowledge on how to process information (that is, how to learn about
early revelation), thus raising the {m} that firm W perceives. Hence, costlessly sharing its
ability to process information may be welfare improving for a firm.21
7. Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a basic framework for investigating the effect of the rate
at which new information is expected to arrive on irreversible investment decisions; our model
separates the effect on investment of total uncertainty about the value of an installed project
into the effects of uncertainty about eventual returns (outcome uncertainty) and revelation
uncertainty. Some of our conclusions are straightforward, others less so. As was argued in the
Introduction, if an event conveys good news both about the possibility of early revelation and
about outcomes, the net effect on investment will depend on which effect dominates. This
appears quite relevant in understanding investment dynamics during a multi-stage reform
program, in which good progress at one stage suggests not only better ultimate outcomes,but
also that residual uncertainty will be resolved faster. Many economies currently undergoing
long and difficult transitions, with investment remaining low in spite of what appear to be large
profit opportunities. A crucial step in understanding such transitions is a framework to analyze
how investment is affected by when it is known whether the transition will be successful.
More generally, an implication of this paper is that investors benefit from earlier
resolution of uncertainty. As in the case of economic transitions, it is unavoidable that the
political process creates uncertainty about when important information will arrive.
Nonetheless, government policy should attempt to do nothing which needlessly increases this
uncertainty, or increases the information differential between firms.22
APPENDIX
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1: Strategies as of time 0 are: commit to investment im-
mediately, wait one period to commit to investment, wait two periods to commit, etc. The
optimal strategy is the one yielding the highest expected value. The expected return to each
of these strategies corresponds to the associated value V(0), so that the optimal strategy is
to wait T* =argrriaxVj(0)periods.
Before proving Proposition 2, we need to specify V(t) in terms of the parameters of the
model. Let us denote by A+(t) the expected gain (as seen from t) of waiting from period
t + i —1to period t + i. This gain is discounted to period t + i —1.Then, 4(t) will
be the present discounted value of the A+(t) from i =1to j,witheach term also being
multiplied by the probability of reaching that date with no resolution of uncertainty. With
no resolution of uncertainty at t, we have
V+(t)A+1(t)+ (1 —+1)A+2(t)+ ...+ (i—t+1)...(1 — (Al)
where V(t)=0. The above equation implies a simple relation between the V+(t) in different
time periods of the form
t+j-m
= V't+jm(t) + 3 [J(1-7r) V+(t + j - m).
s=t+1
This says that the value of waiting until period t+j may be thought of as the value of waiting
until period t +j — mplus the value of waiting another m periods. Thus, any VT.+k (0) may
be thought of as the value of waiting until T* plus the value of waiting another k periods.
If VT. (0) is maximum, the value of waiting any longer once T* has been reached must be
negative.
Now we provide an expression for A(t). Define QU(t) as the expected return (as oft —1)
from time t to Tifuncertainty is resolved at t and the firm has not committed itself to23
investment before t. Define Qc(t)asthe expected return (also as of t —1)from time t to T
ifuncertainty is resolved at t and the firm already has committed itself to investment. Both





Qc(t)= + Tt) [pRh + (1 —p)Rl] (A.3)
where we have used the fact that if the firm has not committed prior to t, it will invest only
if the ralization is R' and obtain a present value as of T of Rh, while if it has committed,
the expected present discounted value of returns at T is [pR' + (1 —p)R].
The net expected gain from waiting to invest until period t + i rather than investing in
period t + i —1,that is, A+(t), will be the excess of QU(t + i) over Qc(t + 1) multiplied
by both the discount rate, j3, and the probability of uncertainty being resolved in t + i (i.e.
7rt+), net of the return r.Wehave, then,
A+(t) =t+i(Qu(t + i) —QC(t+ i)) —r, (A.4)
which allows us to calculate each of the V(t) in terms of underlying parameters. The excess
value of remaining uncommitted, QU (t + 1) —QC(t + 1), will be positive under the reasonable
assumption that the bad outcome occurring with certainty leads to no investment.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2: Using equations (A.1), (A.4) and differentiating with
respect to ir we obtain:
___= i(1i)(1_i)QU(j)
—i)
.. (1—)QU(j+ 1) —
—(1
—i)... (1)(1 — . .. (1—)QC(j)24
When i =j thisreduces to 3V(O)/37r =13i(l7r1)(i__1)[QU(j)_QC(j)] > 0. When
i <j we simplify the expression for aV(0)/3ir by making repeated use of the relationships:
3QU(k) =QU(k1)Pr
Qc(k) =QC(k_1)_r,
for k =i+ 1,... ,j.Thisleads to
50)=- (1-i-1)(1- (1-)[QU(j) QC(j)] + rQ,
where Q is a positive constant and QU(i) > QC(j) (from (A.2) and (A.3)). E
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3: The first part follows from Proposition 2 since an increase
in ir raises the excess value of waiting. To show the second part we differentiate equation
(Al) with respect top and obtain 3V(0)/5p =5A1(0)/3p+(l—rr)3A2(0)/3p+....Note
that 5A(0)/5p =3nj[QU(j)
—QC(j)]/(p
—1)<0. This implies that 5V(0)/3p < 0.
When there are many firms considering the project, as in section 6, the possibility of the
opportunity disappearing, with probability 1 —O,reduces the expected gain of waiting
from t + i —1to t + i, A+(t). Then,
A+(t) =9t+jt+i(Qu(t + i) —QC(t+ i)) —(1
—9t+)Qc(t+ i) —r.
The V+3(t)are,then, formed as a discounted sum of the A+,(t), where the terms are also
discounted by the probability that the opportunity is still available at each date:
V (t) =A+ .+ot+1 (1—nt+_i)At+j (t).
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4: The gain from waiting to invest may be written as
V+(t)= 9t+int+iQU(t+ 1) + Ot+1O+22(1 —nt+i)t+2QU(t+ 2) +25
— — 1]Qc(t+ 1) + 2[9t+19t+2(1— nt+i)(1—t+2) — 1JQC(t+ 2) +
-r-r-....
Notethat QU(j) >QQC(j) >0,0 <8<1,and 0 <7t < 1for all i. Differentiating this
expression with respect to any of the 6l (where i > t) immediately implies that 0V+(t)/39>
0and that DVt+k(t)/&OI <3Vt+h(t)/9Ofor k < h. These two results imply that a decrease
in 9, will cause the 4+(t)to fall and that the value of jforwhich V+3 is maximized will
remain the same or fall. E26
REFERENCES
Bernanke, Ben S, "Irreversibility, Uncertainty, and Cyclical Investment," Quarterly Journal of
Economics, February 1983, 98(1), PP. 85-106.
Bertola, Giuseppe and Ricardo S. Caballero, "Irreversibility and Aggregate Investment,"
Review of Economic Studies, April 1994, 61(2), pp. 223-246.
Calvo, Guillermo and Allan Drazen, "Uncertain Duration of Policy Reforms," mimeo,
University of Maryland, June 1994.
Cukierman, Alex, "The Effects of Uncertainty on Investment under Risk Neutrality with
Endogenous Information," Journal of Political Economy, June 1980, 88(3), PP. 462-75.
Dixit, Avinash and Robert S. Pindyck, Investment Under Uncertainly, Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1994.
Drazen, Allan and Elhanan Helpman, "Inflationary Consequences of Anticipated
Macroeconomic Policies," Review of Economic Studies, January 1990, 57, pp. 147-66.
Epstein, Larry and Stanley E. Zin, "Substitution, Risk Aversion, and the Temporal Behavior of
Consumption and Asset Returns: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of Political Economy,
March 1991, 99(2), pp. 263-85.
Kreps, David and Evan L. Porteus, "Temporal Resolution of Uncertainty and Dynamic Choice
Theory," Econometrica, January 1978, 46(1), pp. 185-206.
McDonald, Robert and Daniel R. Siegel, "The Value of Waiting to Invest," Quarterly Journal
of Economics, November 1986, 101(4), pp. 707-27.
Pindyck, Robert 5, "Irreversible Investment, Capacity Choice, and the Value of the Firm,"





















060 O L0 90 O O O O HO 00
a
C
a
0
a
r
C